{"id":1296,"date":"2024-06-19T10:00:21","date_gmt":"2024-06-19T13:00:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/humanas.blog.scielo.org\/en\/?p=1296"},"modified":"2024-06-13T10:56:41","modified_gmt":"2024-06-13T13:56:41","slug":"exclusionary-reasons-of-joseph-raz","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/humanas.blog.scielo.org\/en\/2024\/06\/19\/exclusionary-reasons-of-joseph-raz\/","title":{"rendered":"The most compelling instances of exclusionary reasons are those which Joseph Raz, in essence, overlooked"},"content":{"rendered":"

Andrea Faggion, Associate Professor, State University of Londrina (UEL), Londrina \u2013 Brazil.<\/strong><\/p>\n

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The complexity of practical reasoning goes beyond weighing a multitude of favorable and unfavorable considerations regarding a given action (Scanlon, 1998; Dancy, 2018).\u00a0 Practical reasoning also has multiple layers.\u00a0 In other words, considerations from different levels impact our deliberation. The topic is the main focus of a recent article published in the journal Trans\/Form\/A\u00e7\u00e3o<\/em>, entitled Are there exclusionary reasons? An inquiry on a third kind of exclusionary reasons<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Joseph Raz sought to capture this phenomenon through the concept of exclusionary reasons. Exclusionary reasons are not reasons that count against or in favor of a particular action. They are reasons for not acting on certain reasons (Raz, 1999). In fact, Raz (1989) dispelled any possible ambiguity of the concept and made it clear to accept only the motivational interpretation of exclusionary reasons. Thus, in summary, exclusionary reasons are negative second-order reasons for not having certain valid first-order reasons as our guiding ones.<\/p>\n

However, not all exclusionary reasons are directly motivational. An example of a directly motivational exclusionary reason is Colin\u2019s promise to his wife. He has committed not to decide which school to enroll their child in based on any reason other than the quality of education the child will receive (Raz, 1999).<\/p>\n

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Imagem: Freepik<\/a>.<\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

In addition to this specific type of exclusionary reason, Raz (1999) also accepted another category of exclusionary reasons\u2014evidential exclusionary ones. The latter is strategically adopted to optimize conformity with the excluded reasons or with the totality of ones applicable to us (Raz, 1989, 2021). In other words, when it comes to this latter type of exclusionary reason, the agent cannot be motivated by a certain reason, but the reason for them to avoid that motivation is an indirect strategy to enhance their conformity with that same reason or with the totality of reasons applicable to them.<\/p>\n

The existence of exclusionary reasons of any kind is controversial, to say the least. In this work, I focus on reasons that are excluded by their very nature. If they exist, it is inherent to their nature that they cannot motivate action; otherwise, there would be no conformity with them. Raz (2021) briefly mentions the possibility that some reasons are inherently unable to motivate action. I provide a representative example from a wide range of cases. In my analysis of the example, I argue that these cases form a third category of exclusionary reasons, potentially the most significant one.<\/p>\n

About Andrea Faggion<\/h3>\n

Andrea Faggion holds a Doctorate in Philosophy from the State University of Campinas and serves as an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the State University of Londrina. Her research is currently supported by a funding grant from the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq).<\/p>\n

References<\/h3>\n

RAZ, J. Facing up: A reply. Southern California Law Review<\/em> [online]. 1989, vol. 62, pp. 1153-1237 [viewed 19 June 2024]. Available from: https:\/\/scholarship.law.columbia.edu\/faculty_scholarship\/757\/<\/a><\/p>\n

RAZ, J. Practical reason and norms. 2. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.<\/p>\n

RAZ, J. Exclusionary reasons. SSRN<\/em> Electronic Journal <\/em>[online]. 2021 [viewed 19 June 2024]. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.2139\/ssrn.3933033<\/a>. Available from: https:\/\/www.ssrn.com\/abstract=3933033<\/a><\/p>\n

To read the article, access<\/h3>\n

FAGGION, Andrea. Are there exclusionary reasons? An inquiry on a third kind of exclusionary reasons. Trans\/Form\/A\u00e7\u00e3o<\/em> [online]. 2024, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 1\u201314 [viewed 19 June 2024]. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1590\/0101-3173.2024.v47.n2.e02400133<\/a>. Available from: https:\/\/www.scielo.br\/j\/trans\/a\/kSbTqwMrp6TSXJghgrxQNjd\/<\/a><\/p>\n

External links<\/h3>\n

Trans\/Form\/A\u00e7\u00e3o \u2013 TRANS: https:\/\/www.scielo.br\/trans\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Trans\/Form\/A\u00e7\u00e3o \u2013 Journal: Instagram<\/a> | Facebook<\/a> | Academia.edu<\/a><\/p>\n

Andrea Faggion \u2013 ORCID: https:\/\/orcid.org\/ 0000-0003-4260-1771<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In his works, Joseph Raz neglected a category of exclusionary reasons: those excluded by their very nature. This category not only shows that the concept of exclusionary reasons is not empty or inconsistent, but also plays a crucial role in elucidating a significant moral domain, namely, the domain of affective relationships. …<\/span> Read More →<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":642,"featured_media":1300,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[7,110],"tags":[146,111],"class_list":["post-1296","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-press-release","category-trans","tag-philosophy","tag-trans-form-acao"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t