{"id":1559,"date":"2025-01-30T16:00:50","date_gmt":"2025-01-30T19:00:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/humanas.blog.scielo.org\/en\/?p=1559"},"modified":"2025-01-29T13:16:21","modified_gmt":"2025-01-29T16:16:21","slug":"processual-thinking-to-unlock-unified-metaphysical-vision-of-reality","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/humanas.blog.scielo.org\/en\/2025\/01\/30\/processual-thinking-to-unlock-unified-metaphysical-vision-of-reality\/","title":{"rendered":"Turning to processual thinking to unlock a unified metaphysical vision of reality"},"content":{"rendered":"

Francesco Maria Ferrari, Postdoctoral Fellow, \u201cAlejandro Korn\u201d Institute of Philosophy, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"Logo<\/a>The study Process Metaphysics: Coherences and Consequences<\/a> (Manuscrito<\/em>, vol. 47, no. 1, 2024) has two primary objectives: to explain how and why processual thought is internally coherent, and to demonstrate that process metaphysics, unlike the more traditional particularist or substance-based metaphysics, is perfectly aligned with what the natural sciences tell us about the fundamentally dynamic nature of reality.<\/p>\n

One crucial aspect of understanding the theoretical advantage of processual models over substantialist ones is their ability to clarify key concepts, such as metaphysical emergence, and consequently, normative emergence, which are considered essential components for the development of naturalized science-informed metaphysics.<\/p>\n

Imagine a world where reality is not defined by particles or material atoms, but by the dynamic processes that govern their evolution. This is the intriguing vision of process metaphysics, an appealing and effective paradigm that, however, requires a revolution in how we comprehend the metaphysical foundation of the evolving universe and its laws (Bickhard, 2011).<\/p>\n

In contrast to the traditional substance-based and \u201cstatic\u201d view, which is centered on particles as isolated entities, process metaphysics offers a fundamentally dynamic and interactive perspective (Bickhard, 2009), and as such, is far more consistent with the evolutionary models provided by the natural sciences.<\/p>\n

Process models enable us to explain complex phenomena, such as life, mind, society, and complexity itself, without resorting to any \u201creduction to (simpler) elements\u201d to fit them into a unified natural reality. Also, there is no need to invoke improbable “deus ex machina” explanations to account for their irreducible particularity. Thanks to innovative models like the one presented in the article by Prof. Mark H. Bickhard (Lehigh University, USA), published in the Special Issue \u201cScientific Process Ontology and Metaphysics\u201d of the journal Manuscrito<\/em> \u2013 Unicamp (vol. 47, no. 1, 2024), the naturalization of metaphysical and normative emergence, as well as the analysis of normative function and the representational capacities of both animals and humans, becomes much more straightforward.<\/p>\n

\"Water's<\/a>

Imagem: Unsplash<\/a><\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

While dynamic phenomena are often understood as processual, it is also common to explain such phenomena through typically non-dynamic elements, such as particles. For example, atmospheric wind is a dynamic process, but it can also be explained using particle-based models, such as gases and atoms. In such cases, however, we would no longer be offering a dynamic model to explain an event we initially perceived as dynamic.<\/p>\n

Process metaphysics, therefore, must go beyond this simple observation to maintain coherence. This, however, presents the following challenge: demonstrating that particle-based metaphysics is not a theoretically adequate candidate to provide such an explanation.<\/p>\n

According to the author, traditional metaphysics is theoretically inadequate when it attempts to explain the dynamic complexity of nature as emerging from<\/em> fundamental particulars (Ferrari and Bickhard, 2023). In this model, the complexity of natural phenomena is either reduced to an epiphenomenal element, i.e., unreal, or conceived as something beyond, incompatible with, and transcendent to empirical and concrete nature (Wilson, 2021).<\/p>\n

This makes it difficult to consider complex phenomena, such as mind and society, as integral parts of natural reality, leading to a division between epiphenomenalism and dualism. Jaegwon Kim\u2019s argument against metaphysical emergence exemplifies this view, as it assumes that only fundamental particles have causal efficacy (Kim, 2005, 2006), thus excluding organizational complexity as a potential source of causation. This renders traditional naturalistic metaphysics incompatible with metaphysical emergence and circular in its reasoning (Ferrari and Bickhard, 2023).<\/p>\n

If metaphysical emergence is indeed possible, then a processual model is required to explain it clearly and transparently. Today, processual models represent a crucial step toward a unified and naturalistic understanding of the world.<\/p>\n

To read the article, access<\/h3>\n

BICKHARD, M. Process Metaphysics: Coherences and Consequences.\u00a0Manuscrito <\/em>[online]. 2024, vol. 47, no.1, e-2024-0057-R1 [viewed 30 January 2025]. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1590\/0100-6045.2024.V47N2.MB<\/a>. Available from: https:\/\/www.scielo.br\/j\/man\/a\/TWgtnBbDR5qQNLPC55Ghz6s\/?lang=en<\/a>.<\/p>\n

References<\/h3>\n

BICKHARD, M.H. The interactivist model. Synthese\u00a0<\/em>[online]. 2009, vol. 166, pp. 547-591 [viewed 30 January 2025]. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s11229-008-9375-x<\/a>. Available from: https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s11229-008-9375-x<\/a><\/p>\n

BICKHARD, M.H. Some consequences (and enablings) of process metaphysics. Axiomathes\u00a0<\/em>[online]. 2011, vol. 21, pp. 3-32 [viewed 30 January 2025]. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s10516-010-9130-z<\/a>. Available from: https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s10516-010-9130-z<\/a><\/p>\n

FERRARI, F.M. and BICKHARD, M.H. On Emergence, Again. Metaphysica\u00a0<\/em>[online]. 2023, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 381-406 [viewed 30 January 2025]. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1515\/mp-2023-0017<\/a>. Available from: https:\/\/www.degruyter.com\/document\/doi\/10.1515\/mp-2023-0017\/html?srsltid=AfmBOoo4P8NG3NkKFIgf8wkRedGWo4-Z0LOPHtY1zwAW7bZqYkMzSGyU<\/a><\/p>\n

KIM, J. Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.<\/p>\n

KIM, J. Emergence: Core ideas and issues. Synthese\u00a0<\/em>[online]. 2006, vol. 151, pp. 547-559 [viewed 30 January 2025]. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s11229-006-9025-0<\/a>. Available from: https:\/\/link.springer.com\/article\/10.1007\/s11229-006-9025-0<\/a><\/p>\n

WILSON, J.M. Metaphysical emergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.<\/p>\n

External links<\/h3>\n

Manuscrito \u2013 MAN<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Imagine a world where dynamic processes, not particles, define reality. Process metaphysics offers a revolutionary perspective, more consistent with natural sciences, explaining complex phenomena like life, mind, and society without reductionism or improbable “deus ex machina” solutions, while still providing a unified view of natural reality. …<\/span> Read More →<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":703,"featured_media":1560,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[102,7],"tags":[103,146],"class_list":["post-1559","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-man","category-press-release","tag-manuscrito","tag-philosophy"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/humanas.blog.scielo.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1559","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/humanas.blog.scielo.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/humanas.blog.scielo.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/humanas.blog.scielo.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/703"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/humanas.blog.scielo.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1559"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/humanas.blog.scielo.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1559\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1571,"href":"https:\/\/humanas.blog.scielo.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1559\/revisions\/1571"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/humanas.blog.scielo.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1560"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/humanas.blog.scielo.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1559"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/humanas.blog.scielo.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1559"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/humanas.blog.scielo.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1559"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}