New volume of MANUSCRITO brings novel contributions to a wide variety of topics in philosophy

Marco Ruffino, Editor, University of Campinas-UNICAMP, CNPq, Campinas, SP, Brazil

Manuscrito is an international journal of philosophy publishing articles on a wide range of philosophical topics, especially in the history of philosophy, philosophy of language, philosophy of the formal sciences, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy and philosophy of mind. The journal does not privilege any particular philosophical approach. Its purpose is to reflect the progress of philosophy as a whole and to increase the exchange of ideas and arguments between different contemporary schools of thought.

In “How to (dis)solve Nagel’s paradox about moral luck and responsibility”, Hiller defends a solution to the moral luck problem based on what he calls “a fair opportunity account of control.” His starting point is Nagel’s claim that moral luck reveals a paradox. Hiller then goes on to argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because Nagel assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions. The author claims that a more modest understanding of what it takes for someone to be a responsible agent dissolves the paradox and shows that responsibility and luck are not at odds.

In “Singular reference without singular thought”, Martone challenges the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference are more or less the same as the conditions for singular thought. He claims that we refer singularly to things without thinking singularly about them more often than it is usually believed. To him, singular reference is cheap, but singular thought is not.

In “Paradoxical versus modulated conditional inferences: An explanation from the Stoicism”, López-Astorga discusses some aspects of Stoic Logic and investigates whether this logic can also explain why people do not always accept inferences involving the conditional introduction rule, as shown by experiments carried out by Orenes and Johnson-Laird. He concludes that it can, and that the results obtained by Orenes and Johnson-Laird can be explained based on the information that the sources provide on Stoic logic.

In “Determinism, Laws of Nature and the Consequence Argument”, Merlussi argues, contra Scott Sehon, that determinism as employed in the Consequence Argument is not implausible. He claims that it is legitimate to read the box of ((P0 & L) (P)) as either metaphysical or logical necessity depending on the account of laws that one assumes. If one accepts a fully Humean account of laws, then the box should be read as logical necessity. He argues that this is not a problem for the Humean, however. On the other hand, if one reads the box as metaphysical necessity, then determinism is compatible with the logical possibility of the laws being violated.

Mendonça reviews Ferreirós and Lassalle Casanave’s recently published book El árbol de los números, which collects new papers on History and Philosophy of Mathematics as well as Mathematical Practice. Mendonça presents a general overview of the papers’ contents and advances a critical analysis of them.

Para ler os artigos, acesse

HILLER, F. R. How to (dis)solve Nagel’s paradox about moral luck and responsibility. Manuscrito[online]. 2016, vol.39, n.1, pp.5-32. [viewed 08 August 2016]. ISSN 0100-6045. DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2016.V39N1.FRH. Available from: http://ref.scielo.org/33696m

MARTONE, F. Singular Reference Without Singular Thought. Manuscrito [online]. 2016, vol.39, n.1, pp.33-60. [viewed 08 August 2016]. ISSN 0100-6045. DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2016.V39N1.FM. Available from: http://ref.scielo.org/d4jrtm

LOPEZ-ASTORGA, M. Paradoxical versus modulated conditional inferences: An explanation from the Stoicism. Manuscrito [online]. 2016, vol.39, n.1, pp.61-72. [viewed 08 August 2016]. ISSN 0100-6045. DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2016.V39N1.MA. Available from: http://ref.scielo.org/p8jg55

MERLUSSI, P. Determinism, Laws of Nature and the Consequence Argument. Manuscrito [online]. 2016, vol.39, n.1, pp.73-96. [viewed 08 August 2016]. ISSN 0100-6045. DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2016.V39N1.PM. Available from: http://ref.scielo.org/fqv7kt

MENDONCA, B. Review of FERREIRÓS, J; LASSALLE CASANAVE, A. El árbol de los números. Editorial Universidad de Sevilla: Sevilla, 2016. Manuscrito [online]. 2016, vol.39, n.1, pp.97-103. [viewed 08 August 2016]. ISSN 0100-6045. DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2016.V39N1.BM. Available from: http://ref.scielo.org/vtq43n

Link externo

Manuscrito – MAN: www.scielo.br/man